The combinatoric problems associated with unrestricted models of human language processing suggest that real-world knowledge systems may have evolved in forms that make combinatoric processing problems linear. The role of Boolean groups and analogy in the extension and elaboration of complex behavioral systems, including natural language, suggests a theory that might account for the changes in human cognitive behavior that began in the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition, and promises to continue through the next century.
Toward a unified theory of multi-model human behavior.
For 150-200,000 years, the material culture of anatomically modern humans showed little or no change. The techniques of stone tool manufacture remained static, there was no representational art, and no unequivocal symbolic behavior (Mellars 1989 (Mellars , 1991 Mellars & Stringer 1989) . However, about 40,000 years ago, quite abruptly, the creative behavior of modern humans entered upon an exponential pattern of growth that continues through the present day. The best evidence seems to indicate that, over a 10,000 year period, modern humans emerged from their place of origin in Africa, and populated the globe. New forms of material and symbolic culture appeared, including representational iconography in 2 and 3 dimensions. No theory of human cognition is truly adequate unless it can account for the changes in human cognitive behaviour that began in the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition. This is a tough constraint; yet, I would add one more:
Few researchers outside of the field of computational linguistics and artificial intelligence are aware of the tremendous ambiguity that is implicit in the phonology and syntax of natural language, unless powerful computational models of behavioral context are brought to bear. Seemingly powerful experimental results based on limited subject matter are, essentially, unproven. Almost every aspect of the problem space is subject to combinatorically increasing demands on computation time, or, in the case of massively parallel computing, combinatorically increasing demands on connectivity.
1 Though computers compute a million times faster than humans, human computation succeeds where computers fail. Any theory of human cognition that cannot account for this difference is also inadequate.
There are a number of theories in each of several disciplines that are concerned with human cognitive behavior that have contradictory premises. I'd like to consider the evidence for a theoretical model that is consistent with at least one theoretical approach in each of them.
Boolean Groups and the Computation of Analogies Exclusive OR and hidden layers
For a connectionist network to learn the exclusive-OR logical operator, it is necessary to introduce at least one hidden layer (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, Plunkett 1996: 60-65) . This is also true for its symmetric counterpart, the strong equivalence operator (Table 1) . If T is replaced by 1, and F by 0, then the exclusive-OR is defined by the arithmetic operation of mod-2 (non carry) addition, and the strong equivalence operator is defined by the rules for multiplying the signs, + and - (Table 2) . Table 2 .
If one creates a 4-valued truth table using binary integers, and the logic of either operator, one obtains a mathematical object called a Klein-4 group (after Felix Klein), which plays a major role in the theories of Piaget ( 1953 ) , and Topology, an field devoted to the study of the properties of geometric objects that are independent of spatial transformations. Table 3 contains a version derived with the strong equivalence operator . 
Iconographic
The analogical computation in Figure 2 , is derived from an ATO analysis of a traditional classification of the 64 hexagrams of the I Ching, a Chinese divination system (Klein 1983: 151-180) . I substituted arbitrary visual elements for each of six lines which might be either open or closed, and represented by 0 or 1,a notation used by Leibniz (1968) 2 The original of A in Figure 
Analogy and Language
ATO logic can model context free phrase structure grammar in the notation of categorial grammar (Klein 1989 (Klein , 1996 
Unifying Visual & Verbal Analogies
Consider the following verbal example . The features, 'male', 'female', 'young', 'adult', 'love', 'hate', 'light', 'dark' are sufficient to formulate the verbal analogy in Table 4 . (Klein 1983: 152, [Figures 1 & 2] ).
Fig. 3. Visual/Verbal Analogy
The Boolean vectors and computations are identical in both examples. If they are combined, the visual and verbal interpretations of the features seem to belong together. Why they seem to combine in a natural way can be explained by interpreting each feature vector as a path down a binary decision tree. The trees for the components of the combined example in Figure 4 are isomorphic, (Klein 1983: 154-155, [Figures 7 & 8] ).
Fig. 4. Isomorphic Visual & Verbal binary trees
The number of terminal elements of such a tree is equal to the number of features of a decision path. If the terminal elements of that tree are projected onto the vertices of a hypercube of dimensionality equal to the number of terminal elements, the analogical relations of the original are present as spatial analogies among edges of the hypercube projection. The unity of the conceptual domains is made especially apparent if the Boolean vectors that were interpreted as paths down the binary decision trees are used to label the associated vertices of the hypercube ( Figure 5 ):
Fig. 5. Projections of 3 & 4 feature binary trees onto 3-dimensional & 4-dimensional cubes
Boolean vectors of n features may also be considered coordinates of concepts in an n-dimensional space, where distance is a measure of concept similarity, and where symmetries in the patterning of lines that connect concepts, reflect analogies that are valid in other notational representations.
Behavioral-Iconographic Analogy
Figures 6a, 6b, 6c & 6d illustrate a combined Behavioral-Iconographic analogy (Klein 1983: 153-154, [Figures 3-6] ). 
Stone Tools and Language
Are motor skills associated with the origins of language? The view that they are is one associated with Piaget, but which remains controversial (Gibson & Ingold 1993) . However, none of the arguments in the debate actually touches upon any of the formal syntactic or semantic aspects of language, nor do they recognize that there can be different types of language and that these can have rather different cognitive prerequisites, e.g. languages describable by finite-state grammars, context-free phrase structure rules, or context-sensitive, nor do they comprehend the cognitive computational requirements each entails, requirements that may be inherent, whatever the brain architecture, and whatever the cognitive model. The importance of language is in what it has enabled its users to do. For that reason, of utmost importance is the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition, the moment when anatomically modern humans, after more than 150,000 years of behavioral banality, began to do rather interesting things.
The Evidence of Boker Tachtit
Astounding as it may seem, it is possible to examine the cognitive processes of individual humans in 20 to 60-second bursts of time, in a collection of events that took place from 38,000 to 47,000 years ago. The hard evidence is recorded in stone, in the form of refitted cores from the archaeological site of Boker Tachtit in the central Negev Desert of southern Israel (Klein 1990 : 551):
"The site was excavated by A. Marks in the 1970s, and revealed a sequence of four superimposed occupation levels, separated by intervening sterile deposits (see Marks 1981 Marks , 1983 . The results of both uranium-thorium and radiocarbon dating indicate that the occupations took place between c. 47,000 and 38,000 BP, placing the site clearly within the conventional time-range of the Middle-Upper Paleolithic transition in the Near East. As Marks point out, one of the most valuable aspects of this sequence is that it represents a series of relatively short-lived episodes of human occupation and tool manufacture in a clear chronological succession (Marks 1983: 68) : '...each occupation surface appears to have been lived on only briefly, as shown by the spatial distributions of reconstructable cores (Hietala and Marks 1981) , and, therefore, each assemblage was produced during only a minute portion of that time. The assemblages taken together, however, should reflect accurately technological and typological patterns at specific intervals during this time span'.
A 'refitted core' represents the reconstruction of the original block of flint from which a tool, or sequence of tools was produced. The refitting process is one of reassembling a 3 dimensional puzzle from the debitage (the remaining flint fragments). An artifact of the refitting process is the knowledge of the exact sequence in which the various flint fragments were detached. The refitting work was accomplished by P. Volkman (1983) , and he produced a tabulation of the various alternative sequences of flint removal that were actually found at each level of the site. These tabulations were for the final sequences of removal that predetermined the production of opposed-platform points at Boker Tachtit. When I saw Volkman's charts, I realized that they reflected the logic of a Klein-4 group, and were amenable to reformulation in a Boolean group notation and analysis for analogical patterning (Klein 1990: 502-506) . The diagram in Figure 7 is Volkman's, and the labeled lines with numbered arrows represent the order and direction of the final detachments of flint in preparation for the final detachment of points (arrows labeled 'P'). Table 5 indicates the different patterns of point production found at the various levels of the Boker Tachtit site (Level 1 is the earliest). (Klein 1990: 506 [Table 18 .3]).
Non-Human use of Tools and Analogy.
The use of tools is not limited to humans. Chimpanzees have been observed to use tools, and even to smash rocks to obtain useful fragments. Sea otters use rocks to open crustacean shells. The process is taught to their young--routinely, a sea otter will swim to the bottom and bring back both a crustacean and a rock, and then, use the rock to open the shell, while floating on its back, with the rock and the crustacean on its belly. There are numerous other examples, where the tool usage appears as learned behavior limited to specific groups of the same species. Wynn (1991) has shown that tools made by very early humans reflected 4-fold symmetry. However, reconstructions of cores that might show varied sequences that form a Boolean group seem unavailable. Nevertheless, it seems likely that ATO type logic, which has been shown to be closely related to context-free phrase structure grammar, is part of the cognitive functioning not just of primates, but of most mammals. Consider the cognitive requirements for the young of a species to learn by imitation. The observed behavior must be seen as a kind of generalized script with roles that may be taken by participants other than just the performer of the moment. Moreover, as part of the imitative process, the pupil must place itself in the role of the teacher in order to perform the observed behaviour, an action usually requiring mirror-image reversal. Also required is an implicit recognition that the teacher and itself are members of a set that can quantify the role in a complex, goal-directed sequence of tasks. Accordingly, the use of ATO logic alone, is not enough to account for the changes in human behavior that began in the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition.
Behavioral Rules and Logical Quantification by Analogy
ATO logic can be used to predict plausible social behavior using examples in the form of situation descriptions in a binary feature notation (Klein , 1988 . Patterns of behavior in one domain can be extended to new situations in other domains. The process involves elevating the objects and relations in one context to a superset status, then computing the equivalence connections of the elements across each domain. The process is facilitated when a society has an active global classification scheme as part of its cosmology. China (Table 7) and India, for example, currently have active systems, and anthropologists have provided ample evidence of the prevalence of such systems in North and South America, and Australia, to name but a few. I believe it is fair to suggest that every society in the world has a global classification scheme in its history, even if its present day usage is limited to artifacts in grammatical categories. This seems to imply an origin in the Upper Paleolithic, and it would have been an invention that made it possible to compute the logical quantification of analogical extensions of behavior to novel situations in novel domains in real time (Klein 1990 ). The essential requirement for complex social organization to function is that the participants can predict the behavior of others. To use one's own behavioral schema to model the behavior of others requires a reassignment of characters to the roles in a particular scheme. Without the existence of a system of constraints, the computation can involve calculations of combinatoric complexity. A global classification scheme provides such a system of constraints, and it permits the computation of analogies by 'table-lookup', rather than by a combinatoric analysis. Table 7 . Chinese global classification system linked to the trigrams of the I Ching.
Linear Computational Efficiency
The behavioral analogy computation, given in an earlier example, implied a binary decision tree, composed of unary features, that resulted in 2 15 = 32,768 terminal elements as situation descriptions (Klein 1983: 155) :
"The tremendous computational advantage of ATOs applied to situation descriptions now becomes clear. To make such calculations it is not necessary to specify [and search] the entire feature tree; rather, one need only enumerate the sets of features relevant to the analogy."
As the number of features in a system increases, the computation time, in the worst case, increases only linearly, as opposed to the exponential or combinatorically increasing processing time typical of other methods of computation. If a cognitive system uses n features, it can account for 2 n concepts. If changing circumstances require just one additional feature to account for some new distinction, the size of the potential cognitive universe doubles, and it can be explored, by ATO logic with only a linear increase in computational effort.
A Unified Computational Model
Consider the following factors:
1. Hidden layers in neural nets were required in order to model the exclusive-OR logical operator, one of the ATO alternatives. 2. Every new analogy requires a change in a category system. Consider the following analogical computation:
The small mouse fears a lion. :: The new student fears an exam.
The large mouse likes a lion. ?
This can be computed by an ATO approach using syntactic trees in categorial grammar notation. Consider the dual-notation grammar in Table 8 . Table 8 . Dual-notation grammar. The ? tree, computed by ATO logic applied to each node of trees A and B, yields an ambiguous result that can be resolved by the positing of an additional analogy, (small :: large ) :: (new :: old), which could form the nucleus for an additional pair of categorizations (Table 9 ). 5. A culturally-based set of behavior patterns that persists across generations implies the existence of a hierarchy of ATOs that has remained stable at its higher levels (Table 10) . This can be interpreted as mechanism for the theory presented in Shore (1996): higher level operators are multiply encoded, through the medium of global classification schemes, in diverse domains of behavior including architecture, music, mythology, religious iconography and ritual, and in language.
With such a model, existing high-level structural patterns of behavior in a society can be applied to new domains, without necessarily modifying any ATOs, by extending the scope of pre-existing global classification schemes . It is worth noting that this view also suggests that it might serve as a model interpretation for Spengler's theories regarding temporal structure of civilizations . .
A post-Post Structuralist Model
The post-Structuralist wing of the post-Modern movement in anthropological & archaeological theory rejected the Structuralism of the 1960's for a number of reasons, among which was its apparent static nature. The theory I have proposed uses the techniques of structuralist analysis for the collection and analysis of data, but makes use of implied logical relations as data for dynamic models of complex social behavior and change. The result is that a structuralist methodology is used to derive the conclusions of post-structuralist theory, and that the structuralist models of Claude Lévi-Strauss appear to have an empirical foundation ( Lévi-Strauss 1962 , 1964 .
Do ATOs Occur in Nature?
The answer is yes, and in the most fundamental processes of life and evolution on the planet. 
2100CE
The title of this paper promises a statement about the future of the human mind during the next century. Let me close by calling your attention to Terrence Deacon's book, The Symbolic Species (1997). Deacon's views on language evolution are ones I share: that the genetically determined innate capacities required in either Chomky's or Pinker's version of such theories is unnecessary. Observed linguistic universals appear because the architecture of the brain makes some language structures computationally inefficient. The languages of the world, which have real functions as communicative devices, have developed in configurations that prevent them from being computationally inefficient. Deacon also describes in considerable detail the mechanisms and the evidence of changes that can take place in brain structure functionality in a single individual in a single lifetime. This suggests to me that the nature of human consciousness may change in significant ways during the next century simply because of the shift to analogic iconographic reasoning that seems inherent in the use of computational media. For a speculation, it is unusually testable, and on a continuing basis, through the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain.
Notes
1. If the problem domain requires combinatorically increasing demands on resources, f(n!), where n is the number of entities involved in the required computations, then even adding an entire computer for each element of n will not help, for f(n!)/n = f((n-1)!), a saving that becomes meaningless as n becomes large.
2. Leibniz was made aware of the I Ching when a Jesuit Missionary in China wrote to him noting that a sequential arrangement of its 6 line figures seemed equivalent to a sequential listing of binary integers, from 0 to 63 .
3. Curry (1961) has sanctioned the use of the term ' functor' for grammatical categories in categorial grammars, rather than the term, 'operator'.
4. Tables 5 and 6 are corrected versions of the ones that appeared in Klein (1990) .
